Myths & Propaganda: The Legacy of the USSR in modern Russia
Russia is renowned for its talent in propaganda. The critical role of media in persuading others was recognized as early as the Bolsheviks' time, with the printing of agitational materials, including newspapers, such as Pravda and Iskra, which were distributed among workers and the intelligentsia. However, the peak of Soviet propaganda flourished during World War II - or as Russians refer to it, the "Great Patriotic War". The myths and narratives were so effective back then that today's masterminds of Russian propaganda barely innovate, relying heavily on the very same "Great Patriotic Propaganda" in their war against Ukraine. This article will delve deeper into analyzing which techniques Russia continues to use and why they are so effective in shaping national consciousness.
Made in Russia: Newspeak
The term Newspeak was coined by George Orwell in his novel 1984. Newspeak is a controlled propagandistic language characterized by euphemism, the softening of reality, and the inversion of customary meanings. One example of this language has already been mentioned in reference to the "Great Patriotic War". This term is commonly used in Russia to describe the period from June 22, 1941, to May 9, 1945, as Russia avoids addressing its invasions of several territories in 1939–1940, beginning with Poland (this aggression also received the special name of "Liberation march of the Red Army"), which occurred under a non-aggression pact with Germany. This rebranding of the term perpetuates the narrative that Russians were solely victims who triumphed over the Nazis, rather than acknowledging their role as aggressors. In contrast, Ukraine has moved towards recognizing the USSR's actual role at the start of World War II.
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine does not called as such in Russia. The Russian official term is simply “Special Military Operation”, a euphemism that conceals the scale and aggressive nature of the war. The Russian Prosecutor General's Office itself explained that the Russian invasion of Ukraine cannot be called a war, since the use of the term "war" implies "the onset of legal consequences." This narrative benefits the regime, both in terms of international positioning and in fostering a heroic sentiment among its people – a sense they are "fighting the West." Pro-Kremlin media always draw the attention of citizens that Russia is battling the West, and not Ukraine, redirecting citizens' attention to bigger conflict.
Back then, only the Communist Party and Stalin were portrayed as the protectors of the USSR. Today, Russia, which claims to be the USSR’s successor, has positioned Putin as the defender of the “Russian world” and “traditional values”. But what exactly is being protected? During World War II, the term “fascists” was used as a generalized image of the enemy. Today, Russians demonize Ukrainians by labeling them “Nazis” and invoking the term “denazification” to justify their aggression.
The need for protection was also invoked against “spies” and “traitors,” though in reality, these terms were often used to justify repression against the Soviet people by the Communist party. A modern parallel is easy to spot in Russia, where any form of opposition is labeled as an “Inoagent” (from Russian: “foreign agent”). While in the English-language tradition, a foreign agent can be perceived as a legal status without a strong negative connotation, in Russian rhetoric it actually means “enemy of the state”. As long as the authorities claim they are under "foreign influence", the law regarding "foreign agents" can be applied to almost any individual or organization, regardless of nationality or location - that participates in civic activism or even voices opinions about the actions of Russian officials or policies.
The most significant threat requiring protection, however, is portrayed as coming from the West. In Soviet times, it was framed as the USSR’s future enemy; today, it is the "collective West," viewed as a unified adversary supporting Ukraine. This narrative extends to the so-called "West’s economic war" against Russia, used to justify sanctions and the economic crisis.
"Russians don't start wars, Russians end them"
In this constructed narrative, Russia is portrayed as an eternal victim, constantly under attack, yet never surrendering—always "peace-loving" and even "helping" others. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was presented as an act of peace, with the alliance with Nazi Germany framed as an agreement of non-aggression and mutual pacifism. Stalin himself stated: "Could the Soviet government have rejected such a proposal? I think no peace-loving state can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring power, even if that power is led by such fiends and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop." However, the secret part of the pact, which outlined the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, was never mentioned.
Modern Russia, on the other hand, often characterizes itself with the phrase: "Russians don't start wars, they finish them," attributed to Andrey Tkachev, a clergyman of the Russian Orthodox Church. Referring to the deployment of Russian troops into Ukrainian territory, he stated: "If we had done nothing, in two years, they would have come here, showing no mercy and without any warning. And if they had entered, they would have slaughtered us and smeared our roofs with blood."
However, Russians are portrayed not only as “liberators” and “helpers of others,” but also remain “victims” in the narratives of the Russian elite. A well-known example is Putin’s statement at the 2018 Valdai Forum, where he said: “We’ll go to heaven as martyrs, and they’ll just croak.” He used this phrase to refer to the “inglorious death of the enemies,” in contrast to the “direct ascension to heaven” of Russians in the event of nuclear war.
This narrative is reinforced by two key actions crucial for propaganda. The first is the rewriting of history. In the Soviet Union, the silencing of certain topics was not limited to the era of World War II. In fact, suppressing specific issues was a fundamental part of state policy to maintain the "party line" and control over society. Topics that were either silenced or distorted included political purges and repressions during 1937–38, which involved mass arrests and deportations of "enemies of the people," as well as the concealment of the GULAG system. The artificially created famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other regions was also left unaddressed, as were the deportations of entire ethnic groups, including Crimean Tatars, Ingush, Kalmyks, and others.
Disasters such as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and the lesser-known Kyshtym disaster—a man-made radiological emergency involving an explosive release of radioactive substances on September 29, 1957, at the Mayak chemical plant in the closed city of Chelyabinsk-40 (now Ozersk in Russia)—were also suppressed. Such actions not only helped maintain power and create the image of an infallible state but also served to conceal internal problems, allowing the authorities to shift the citizens' focus to external enemies such as "fascists," "spies," or "Western imperialists." This also allowed manipulation of fear, as repressions and deportations helped hide the scale of brutality and prevent protest movements.
Modern Russian propaganda continues to use exactly the same mechanisms. Russia still works to downplay Soviet crimes, for example, by dissolving the non-governmental organization Memorial, which was established to research political repressions in the USSR. However, Russia now has much to conceal even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it does so effectively.
Of course, Russia conceals the deployment of its troops to the Donbas region and justifies the annexation of Crimea as a "legitimate referendum". Additionally, despite the findings of independent investigators such as Bellingcat and the ruling by the Netherlands regarding Russia's responsibility for the MH17 tragedy, Russia continues to invent alternative versions of the event. The tragedy involved a Malaysian Boeing 777 performing a scheduled flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur that was shot down by Russian military forces over Ukrainian territory, killing all 298 crew members and passengers. Russia continues to invent alternative versions of events. These include absurd claims, such as the suggestion that all the people on board were already dead.
In its war against Ukraine, Russia hides the exact figures of military and civilian casualties. Political repressions and the number of political prisoners are also silenced, with those detained typically labeled as "extremists" or "foreign agents." These tactics serve to distort reality and maintain the Kremlin's narrative.
The narrative of the “peace-loving” Russia is reinforced by two key actions crucial for propaganda. The second reinforcement is the creation of historical myths.
Be worthy of the memory of our great ancestors!
In Russian state propaganda, the narrative about Russia being peace-oriented is not merely stated — it is ritually reinforced through symbolic references to the past, particularly via the cult of ancestral memory. This strategy is not new. It draws heavily from Soviet propaganda traditions, most notably by positioning itself as a vanguard of global socialism, a civilizational force locked in a historical struggle against Western imperialism and capitalist exploitation. Peace was never understood as something conditional or universal, it was always framed as a struggle of socialist principles over bourgeois domination.
This vision brings us back to the mythos of the so-called “Great Patriotic War”. The Soviet state elevated the war not just as a moment of national survival, but as the ultimate proof of socialism’s moral superiority. The memory of collective sacrifice — of soldiers, workers, women, and peasants who contributed to the war effort — was woven into the very fabric of Soviet identity. It was deployed to legitimize the regime’s authority, to foster unity across class and ethnic lines, and to create a sense of historical destiny rooted in antifascist heroism.
Propaganda across the various media forms, both then and now, draws attention to the “memory of ancestors”, who are portrayed as a source of inspiration for Russians in their struggle and as figures they must not betray.
Such instrumentalization of the past is not organic, nor appeared from genuine historical appreciation – it is highly curated and politicized. Through the selective glorification of certain historical periods, the regime was constructing in the USSR and continues to construct now a narrative in which the present is a continuation of heroic, righteous struggle. This manipulative form of nostalgia has its own name: “state-driven memory politics.” For instance, slogans like “We remember the past, we create the future” blend reverence for past victories with a call to action in the present, effectively turning memory into a mobilizing force.
This narrative is very useful for emotional stability of citizens in times of isolation and crisis. The past presents as a golden age of unity, strength, and moral clarity when the future is uncertain due to wars, social instability and sanctions. This creates a powerful form of emotional nationalism: pride in the past becomes pride in the present regime, and shame or criticism of the past becomes taboo and even punishable.
A striking example of how this emotional nationalism is institutionalized is the restoration of the Soviet hymn in 2000. By reviving the familiar and emotionally charged music of the USSR, the Russian government under Vladimir Putin sought to foster a sense of historical continuity and national pride, while rewriting the lyrics to reflect the new post-Soviet reality. The anthem became a tool of emotional consolidation, especially for those who had lived through the Soviet time and associated the melody with military triumph, geopolitical strength, and collective purpose.
Both in the USSR and in modern Russia, the “love for the past” is not about remembering. It is about aligning the citizen with a state-approved version of memory. It is not history – it is a powerful myth with a purpose: to justify war, centralize power, and forge a national identity rooted not in pluralism, but in sacred continuity.
Conclusion
By using Newspeak and constructed narratives of a "peace-loving" and "helping" country that is a victim of constant foreign threats, propaganda shapes citizens who are loyal to the government and unwilling to oppose it — either out of support of all actions or fear to resist. These citizens become ready to fight for propaganda-created purposes like the “denazification of Ukraine,” which is simultaneously framed as a response to a “NATO threat.” Propaganda succeeds not only because of cleverly created narratives and strategic use of language, but also due to a tightly controlled media landscape. The Soviet regime established a monopoly on truth, filtering all media through the lens of Party ideology. Alternative perspectives, foreign broadcasts, or critical voices were either banned, heavily censored, or ridiculed as hostile propaganda. Moreover, it was not so popular to study foreign languages, as citizens knew that it is not useful, there were almost no opportunities to travel or access information in a foreign language.
In contemporary Russia, the media landscape is not fully totalitarian but increasingly resembles the information control structures of the Soviet past. Over the past two decades, the Kremlin has reasserted dominance over major TV channels, silenced independent media outlets, labeled dissenting journalists and bloggers as “foreign agents,” and flooded the information space with disinformation, half-truths, and emotionally charged patriotic content. While the internet once offered a space for open discourse, it is now heavily surveilled and censored, with access to foreign platforms restricted and citizens prosecuted for “spreading fake news”.
This hybrid model of control that includes combining Soviet-style censorship with modern digital manipulation, makes Russian propaganda particularly effective. Citizens are not only shielded from alternative views, but also overwhelmed by state-approved narratives that blur the line between truth and fiction, creating confusion, apathy, or blind loyalty. In both eras, the goal remains the same: to limit public debate, neutralize dissent, and manufacture consent.
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Links:
"The Prosecutor General's Office explained why it is forbidden to call war a war", Meduza, 2022 https://meduza.io/news/2022/07/21/genprokuratura-ob-yasnila-pochemu-voynu-zaprescheno-nazyvat-voynoy-eto-predpolagaet-nastuplenie-pravovyh-posledstviy
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"Expert believes that the West's economic wars require a response from the global majority", TASS, 2024 https://tass.ru/ekonomika/21049269
"Strelkov: Most of the passengers on the Boeing 777 died several days before the crash", nakanune.ru, 2014 https://www.nakanune.ru/news/2014/7/18/22361407
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Andrey Tkachev, clergyman of the Russian Orthodox Church, BBC, March 2022
https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-60655883Putin at Valdai Forum, 2018, ““We’ll go to heaven as martyrs, and they’ll just croak.””
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJchFG8bYFk